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CURRENT DECISIONS
BAIL-RIGHT TO RELEASE ON BAIL PENDING-PROCEEDINGS IN ERROR-JUDICIAL
DlscR.rIoN.-The defendant was convicted in the United States District Court,
with other members of the I. W. W., of conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act.
A writ of error having been granted, he sought enlargement on bail pending the
hearing of the writ by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Held, that admission to
bail should be denied. United States v. St. John (1918, C. C A. 7th) 254 Fed.
794.
Before conviction, with a very few exceptions, admission to bail is a matter
of right. After conviction, it is not. It requires a rule of court to allow bail.
See Rule 34 of the Circuit Court of Appeals. Its grant is a matter of judicial
discretion, usually exercised in favor of the defendant in the case of minor
offenses, but generally denied when the public interests make it seem advisable.
Considerations affecting the determination are the severity of the punishment,
the nature of the offense, the health of the prisoner, the character of the evidence,
the good faith of the assignments of error, the conduct of the accused, and the
public welfare.
BILLS AND NOTEs-LABILITY OF AGENT AS MAKER-DESCRIPTIO PERSONAE.-The
defendants signed a note: "Trustees of the Second Christian Church," and
imnediately thereunder: "X, Y, Chairman, Z." The loan for which the note
was given was understood to be made to the church; the trustees had expressly
told the plaintiff's agent that they could not take on individual liability, and the
agent drew the note in this form with that understanding. On default, the
plaintiff payee sued the church alone, and recovered judgment, but failed to
realize the amount of the note. She then sued the plaintiffs, as being personally
liable on the note. Held, that judgment must be directed for the plaintiff.
Weaver, J., dissenting. Schuling v. Ervin (i918, Iowa) 169 N. W. 686.
The decision is as regrettable as it is amazing. It has been thought that the
N. I. L. sec. 2o (sec. 3o6o-a2o, Iowa Code Supp. 1913) which was considered by
the court, had settled this question in accordance with business understanding
and that of the plaintiff in this case, when she sued the church. (1918) 27
YALE LAw JOuRNAL, 686. The court, however, ignoring recent Iowa decisions
to the contrary, concluded by main strength that (I) the face of the note did
not show what principal, if any, the trustees were signing for; (2) that the
plaintiff's agent was also the agent of the trustees, so that knowledge of com-
munications made to him could not be imputed to her; and (3) that the trustees
might be held, if not as principals, then as sureties for the principal who did not
appear on the note's face to be such. It would be hard to find a better com-
mentary on the decision than the sound and forceful dissenting opinion of
Weaver, J.
BILLS QuJA TIMET-CANCELLATION-INTRUMENT VOID ON ITS FACE:.-An
assignment of wages to become due "from present and future employers" had
ceased to have any legal effect for two reasons: (I) that the state law refused
to recognize the validity of an assignment of future wages except so far as
earned under an employment existing at the time of the assignment, whereas
the assignor in the principal case had terminated such employment; and (2)
that the state statutes limited such to the wages for the two years next ensuing,
whereas in this case more than two years had elapsed since the assignment-as
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the date showed. The assignor asked equitable relief by way of cancellation
and an injunction to prevent the assignee from seeking to enforce the assignment.
Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to cancellation and an injunction. Raulines
v. Levi (1gig, Mass.) 121 N. E. 500.
The decision goes on the ground that the action of the defendant in serving
notice of the void assignment upon new employers was "oppressive." The
result reached is a sensible one, but difficult to reconcile with the large number
of decisions in which courts have refused equitable relief on the ground -that the
instrument whose cancellation is asked is void on ifs face. For an intelligent
discussion of the problem see Day Co. v. State (1887) 68 Tex. 527, 64 S. W. 865.
CARUERs-L A3rY-FRAuDULENT PROCUREMENT OF CoNFIscATIoN.-The
defendant carrier accepted live poultry from the plaintiff for interstate shipment
and issued the customary bill of lading, which provided that the carrier should
not be liable for any loss or damage to the property "caused by the authority
of the law." The car containing the poultry was caught in a flood which over-
flowed the rails and made access to it difficult. Martial law being proclaimed in
the flooded district, the carrier, by representations either false or not known to
be true, induced the military authorities to "confiscate" the poultry. In an
action by the plaintiff, based on the bill of lading, the defendant claimed that it
was prevented from performing its contract "by the authority of the law."
Held, that the defendant was liable. Chicago & E. Ill. R. R. v. Collins Produce
Co. (March 3, 199) U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term, 1918, No. 138.
The fiduciary character of the common carrier's duty was recognized early in
the common law, and the carrier, in consequence, was made an insurer. This was
felt to be necessary in order to prevent dishonesty and collusion between the
carrier or its servants and others, to the injury of the shipper. Coggs v. Bernard
(17o4, K. B.) 2 Ld. Raym. gog; Riley v. Horne (1828, Eng. C. P.) 5 Bing. 217.
The same principle has been almost universally adhered to in the United States
and the greatest care and good faith required of the common carrier in both its
contractual duties and its common-law liabilities. Railroad Co. v. Lockwood
(1873, U. S.) 17 Wall. 357, 21 L. ed. 627; Bank of Kentucky v. Adains Express
Co. (1876) 93 U. S. 174, 23 L. ed. 872. This requirement of good faith has been
so rigid that a carrier, which by fraud or connivance permitted a judgment to be
rendered against it for property in its charge, was not allowed to avail itself of
the judgment in bar to a suit by the shipper. Ainerican Express Co. v. Mullins
(1909) 212 U. S. 311, 29 Sup. Ct. 381. The instant case affords another illustra-
tion. A discussion of the liability of common carriers under the Act to Regulate
Commerce may be found in (i9i6) 25 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 341.
CONTRAcTS-IMPOSSIBIITY OF PERFORMANCE-INTERFERENCE WITH DELIVERY OF
GOODS CAUSED By WA.-Early in 1914 the defendants contracted to deliver cer-
tain Finland birch timber at Hull, England. Before the time for delivery
expired the war broke out and made it impossible to ship the timber from a
Finnish port through the Baltic. This was the usual mode of shipment and
other modes were much more expensive. This fact was unknown to'the plain-
tiff, nor did he know that Finnish birch was not kept in stock in England. Held,
that the continued possibility of delivering by way of the Baltic was not an
implicit condition of the contract and that the plaintiff was entitled to damages
for non-delivery. Blackburn Bobbin Co. v. Allen (1918, C. A.) 11g L. T. Rep.
215.
It should be observed that performance in this case did not become impossible,
for shipment could have been made to the North Sea by rail through Sweden.
Since the plaintiff did not know what was the normal mode of shipping he could
not be held to have consciously contracted with its continued possibility as a
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basis. Thus such a case as Clarksville Land Co. v. Harriman (1895) 68'N. H.
374, 44 AtL. 527, can be distinguished. The court properly applies the principles
laid down in Tamplin S. S. Co. v. Anglo-Mexican Co. (H. L.) [1916] 2 A. C.
397, and Horlock v. Beat (H. L.) [1x16] i A. C. 486. See also (i918) 27 YALE
LAW JoURNAL, 953; (IgIg) 28 ibid. 399; and see note below.
CONRACS--IMPossIBILrY OF PERFORMANCE-WAR CLAUsE.-After war had
broken out between England and Germany, the defendants in the United States
contracted to supply the plaintiffs with chemicals imported from Germany. The
contract released the sellers from liability for losses, damages or delay due to
"war." On March 15, 1915, a British Order in Council prohibited all exports
from Germany. The plaintiff sued for damages for failure to make further
deliveries. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover. Roessler & Hasslacher
Chemical Co. v. Standard Silk Dyeing Co. (1918, C. C. A. 2d) 254 Fed. 777.
The lower court had held that war having been in existence when the con-
tract was made, the exception as to "war" could have referred only to a future
war in which the United States should be involved. The Circuit Court of
Appeals, however, held that the contract having been legal and possible of per-
formance when made, notwithstanding the war then in existence, the exception
must have referred to a change of conditions in that war or any war rendering
performance impossible. This interpretation commends itself as reasonable.
See also note above.
DAMAGES-MEDICAL SEnvIcEs-CHmRoPRAcTOR.-In an action against the city for
personal injuries the plaintiff included, as an item of damage, money which she
had paid to a chiropractor for services rendered. The chiropractor was not
authorized to practice medicine within the state. Held, that the plaintiff could
recover as part of her damages "the reasonable value paid in good faith for such
services." Miller v. City of Eldon (1919, Iowa) 17o N. W. 377.
A person not authorized to practice medicine cannot recover in a suit for
medical services. Puckett v. Alexander (889) 1o2 N. C. 95, 8 S. E. 767; Lynch
v. Kathman (1917) i8o Iowa, 6o7, 163 N. W. 4o8. But if payment has been made
for such services, there is authority in support of the principal case. Allen v.
Durham Co. (9o7) I44 N. C. 288, 56 S. E. 942. Christian Science "healers"
have been held to be within the terms of statutes requiring all persons practicing
medicine to be licensed. State v. Buswell (1894) 4o Neb. i58, 58 N. W. 728;
Smith v. People (ig) 51 Colo. 270, 117 Pac. 612. But they have been held
exempted by a clause providing that the statute should not affect "those who
practice the religious tenets of any_ church." People v. Cole (i916) 219 N. Y.
98, 113 N. E. 79o. There seems to be no good reason why the doctrine of the
principal case should not be extended to them. But the question is an interesting
one as to how far an unorthodox form of healing must gain ground before it
will be so recognized.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS.-SOVEREIGN AS DEFENDANT.-A contract was made
between the plaintiff and the Secretary of State for War acting on behalf of
the Crown. This action was brought against the Secretary of State for War
asking for a declaration as to the meaning and legal effect of the contract. Held,
that the action was not maintainable. Hosier Bros. v. Earl of Derby (1918,
C. A.) Iig L. T. Rep. 351.
The court said: "An action can no more be successfully brought against a
servant of the Crown for a declaration as to what a contract means than it can
be brought for a substantive remedy on the contract itself." As to declaratory
judgments generally, see the article by Professor Borchard (i918) 28 YALE LA W
JOURNAL, 1, 105.
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STATUTES-CONSTRUCTIoN-OMIsSON OF "NOT" DEFEATING PURPOSE OF
STATTE.-The defendant was accused of violating a statute which in effect
prescribed that the beam from automobile lights must be such as to shine in the
eyes of drivers of vehicles meeting the automobile. It was shown that by a
clerical error the word "not" had been omitted from the statute as enacted,
reversing the statute's effect. Held, that the defendant must be discharged, as,
by reason of the error, there had been a failure of legislation. State v. Claiborne
(1919, Iowa) 17o N. W. 417.
The court thought it proper to take into consideration the evil sought to be
remedied, and was satisfied that the intent of the legislature was not to pass the
act as it read, but was not disposed to read into the statute a word which would
give it the opposite effect. A somewhat parallel situation is sometimes found in
the interpretation of wills.
TAXATION-MUNICIPAL BoNDs-CoNsTRuCTIoN OF STATUTE.-The Pol. Code of
South Dakota, sec. 2053, provides that "all property . . . . within the state
... . is subject to taxation." The plaintiff, being taxed on bonds of a munici-
pality in South Dakota, brought suit against the county treasurer. Held, that
such bonds do not come within the term "all property" as used in the statute.
National Surety Co. v. Starkey (igi, S. D.) 17o N. W. 582.
A state may tax all property within its jursidiction, but for obvious reasons
public property is usually exempt, either by statute or judicial interpretation.
37 Cyc. 865. State or municipal bonds are not state property; but a tax on
them is, in the last analysis, a tax on the borrowing power, and will interfere
with its exercise. Unless a statute expressly makes such bonds taxable, a
court is not justified in including them, as the legislature should not be presumed
to intend to interfere with one governmental function when exercising another.
Penick v. Foster (i9o7) 129 Ga. 217, 58 S. E. 773. The weight of authority sup-
ports the principal case, which is unidoubtedly sound. State ex rel. La. Imp. Co. v.
Board of Assessors (i9o2) iii La. 982, 36 So. gi. The few cases opposed seem
to be based on a too strict interpretation of the phrase "all property." See
State NatL. Bank v. Memphis (i9o6) ii6 Tenn. 641, 94 S. W. 6o6, 7 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 663, and note; Champaign County Bank v. Smith (1857) 7 Ohio St. 42.
